Marek Mikuš

FIELD NOTES FRAGMENT: PERFORMING STATEHOODS IN ORAŠAC

On the Christian feast of Sretenje (The Presentation of Jesus at the Temple) in 1804, the First Serbian Uprising against the declining Ottoman domination began in Orašac, a village some 70 kilometres south of Belgrade in the Central Serbian region of Šumadija. The uprising was but the beginning of the wars of independence known as the Serbian Revolution (1804–1817) which prepared the ground for the formation of a modern Serbian state. Indeed, on Sretenje of 1835 the Constitution of the then Principality of Serbia was adopted. In Serbia today, Sretenje – falling on 15 February in the modern Gregorian calendar – is not only a Church holiday. According to a 2001 law, it is also a key državni praznik (‘state holiday’, as opposed to ‘religious holidays’) called Dan državnosti Srbije (Serbia’s Statehood Day). Interestingly, a 2006 presidential decree declared this date also the Serbian Army Day. This completes the symbolic association of Serbian statehood with the military, the critical actor in the consolidation and expansion of the Serbian state in the 19th century, as well as with Christianity, more specifically with its brand practiced by the autocephalous national church – the Serbian Orthodox Church. While the latter link was actively repressed in the socialist Yugoslavia and not officially endorsed by the Milošević regime which did not mark a clean break with socialist symbolism, it became much more prominent after 2000 with the final death of the idea of Yugoslavism and the quest of the Serbian state for a new identity. That the chain of associations revealed by the multiplication of holidays celebrated on 15 February is fully intentional rather than random was this year confirmed, among others, by the Serbian president Boris Tadić who was quoted as saying that ‘the proclamation of 15 February the Statehood Day and the Serbian  Army Day renews the deepest historical and traditional link in the [process of] founding and building of our state and its army’.

The triple link was also manifested in celebrations which took place in Orašac, at the site commemorating the First Serbian Uprising. In the morning, the high Church dignitary vladika šumadijski Jovan served a mass in the nearby Church. Flags of Kraljevina Srbija (The Kingdom of Serbia), an association sponsored by the heir to the throne Aleksandar II  Karađorđević which, predictably, advocates the return to parliamentary monarchy, could be seen at the churchyard. Following the mass, a mixed procession of Church and lay dignitaries transferred to the commemorative site, which forms a sort of stage at the bottom of a natural amphitheater. Taking the asphalt path and stairs leading from the church to the commemorative site, they passed between two lines of men facing each other who had taken the positions during the service. The majority of men were wearing uniforms, mostly reminiscent of the black or less commonly green uniforms of četnici, the monarchist paramilitaries fighting in the WWII second against the Germans as well as the communist Partisans. The men were holding easily recognizable četnik flags, with white skull and bones on black background and reading ‘For king and fatherland; freedom or death’, as well as the flags of the contemporary četnik Ravna Gora Movement whose name refers to the region in which the original četnik militias formed. Many other men in the crowd could be seen wearing full or partial uniforms; apart from the četnik ones, a few older men sported traditional peasant-style uniforms.

After the procession reached the site surrounded by a crowd of onlookers, a special commemorative service (pomen) for Đorđe Petrović Karađorđe, the leader of the First Uprising and the founder of the royal house of Karađorđević of which Aleksandar II is a descendant, was served. The attendees of note then laid laurel wreaths at the monument. These included the crown prince, the representatives of the Aranđelovac municipality of which Orašac is a part, the delegation of the Serbian Army and government officials. Significantly, the latter were represented by the Minister of Religion Bogoljub Šijaković and the delegation of the Ministry of Defense, i.e. officials to do with religion and the military. Speeches of the president of the municipality and the heir ensued, followed by a short rodoljubiva poezija (patriotic poetry) award ceremony and some poem-reading. The event concluded by performances of a local folk music group and of a female performer who sang, in an angelic voice, the revolutionary anthem of the First Serbian Uprising Vostani Serbie (Arise, Serbia).

Understanding this event would be impossible without taking into account the vehement behaviour of the crowd. First of all, I have already mentioned that many men wearing uniforms or parts of uniforms were in attendance. The banners of the original četnik movements and its contemporary epigones completed the strong military symbolism of the event. (It is important to point out, however, that the state organized another, much bigger celebration of the Statehood Day and the Serbian Army Day which was essentially a military parade combined with state medal awards. The fact that it took place in Belgrade and on Sunday, although this was two days before the actual holiday date, suggests this was intended to be the main official festivity for the public.) Other banners disclosed the presence of some of the most important far-right nationalist movements or NGOs. While the group of Obraz supporters, holding one long banner, stood on one side of the passage leading to the commemorative site (through which the procession passed on its way from the church), was relatively small and peaceful, the other side of the passage was occupied by a much larger and rowdier crowd of SNP Naši 1389 standing next to the people holding četnik and Kraljevina Srbija flags. In this part of the crowd, the 19th century flag of Imperial Russia could be seen, as well as current flags of Serbia and two banners of SNP Naši 1389 opposing Serbia’s accession to the European Union.

The crowd reacted in different ways to four other types of persons in attendance: the policemen securing the event, the government and municipality representatives, the Church dignitaries and the heir to the throne. The policemen formed a cordon on both sides of the passage, presumably to protect the distinguished guests from a potential attack by an onlooker. As they were standing face-to-face with the first row of the supporters of far-right movements, it was obvious that at least some of them engaged in friendly conversations with the latter. As for the other categories of attendants, people reacted to them when they walked to the stage, spoke or were mentioned by the host of the ceremony. Even before the procession started to descend to the commemorative site, the crowd shouted the names of two of the most prominent Serbs suspected of war crimes during the Yugoslav wars - Ratko Mladić and Radovan Karadžić. When the government officials approached and laid laurel wreaths as well as when the municipality president spoke, they responded with booing and shouting Ustanak! (‘Uprising!’). They also sang, hooligan style, Spasi Srbiju i ubij se, Borise (‘Save Serbia and kill yourself, Boris’, Boris being the president of Serbia Tadić). On the other hand, the presence and speech of the heir to the throne was appreciated by calls Imamo kralja! (‘We have a king!’). (However, more quietly, some people exchanged amused comments about the heir’s bad Serbian, which is a subject of much mocking and contempt in Serbia. This may suggest that the crown prince marshals support because he stands for the general idea of monarchy rather than by his perceived personal qualities.) Finally, the audience enthusiastically sang prayers together with vladika, and at the sound of the bells as well as the sight of the approaching Church procession nearly everyone crossed themselves the Orthodox way. Very interesting was the appeal to the crowd after the procession reached the stage and before the first, religious part of the programme commenced. A kind voice from the speakers asked the crowd to stop shouting, ‘because the prayer is most important’, and said that they can continue to shout ‘what is pleasant (udobno) to God’ after the prayer, thus implying an endorsement of their messages and their compatibility with Orthodox Christianity.

The appearance of the audience, their banners and verbal and non-verbal reactions to various components of the official programme represented an active dialogic contribution to the event. More than that, it revealed a lot about the reception of the event, the participants and their performances by the audience or it least its more clamorous and conspicuous part), and is thus crucial for the contextualization not only of the event itself, but also of the institutions and ideas that these participants and their actions represented to the crowd. First of all, the amalgamate of statehood, Orthodox Christianity and militarism was as much intended by the organizers (or indeed the Serbian state which legally defined the holiday in the described manner) as it was performed by the crowd, but these two performances were somewhat different. While the woman hosting the event was careful to repeatedly point out that the event also celebrated The Republic of Serbia’s Statehood Day, the symbols carried and worn by the audience were unmistakably monarchist. Nevertheless, neither the organizers did clearly reject the royal idea, as they invited the heir to the throne and allowed the open promotion of the royalist party he sponsors. This illustrates that the identity of Serbian state remains somewhat incomplete and ambiguous; while constitutionally a republic, in its quest to define its Serbianness, the state is compelled to turn to its ‘authentic’ monarchic roots as opposed to republicanism associated with the failed Yugoslav project. Furthermore, the audience reacted rather positively to the crown prince, whereas the government officials and the municipality president were identified as representatives of the ‘regime’ which, given its declared pro-European and liberal orientation, could only be an enemy. By responding to them with the calls to rise up (Ustanak!), the crowd mapped the popular resistance against the present regime onto the heroic rebellion against the Ottomans; this semantic association simultaneously marked the government as a rule ‘foreign’ to the nation. Finally, the Church dignitaries and their actions were approached with the highest respect and allegiance, thus completing the performative construction of a Serbian nation which, now and then, longs for a neo-Byzantine monarchic state supported by the strong military and sanctified by the blessings of the national Orthodox Church. Paradoxically, although the present regime was openly dismissed by the audience as the enemy of the desired statehood, it had itself supported such a construction by adopting a favourable legal framework and by delegating officials dealing with religious and military affairs to represent the government in the event.